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Abstract: In contradiction with the promise to break with its post-colonial past and some 
attempts to change its foreign policy, France has reengaged itself massively in African crises. 
The military interventions launched in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Central African Republic 
seem to define a new French interventionist policy South of the Sahara. Based upon extensive 
surveys conducted in Côte d’Ivoire among young pro-Gbagbo militants, this article tries to 
interpret this new stance from below. It contends that the nationalist and anti-colonial mobi-
lisations that took place in the country were not only instrumental in local power bargaining. 
They were (and are still) a powerful leverage for generational emancipation and reflect some 
conflicts of subjectification which will be key in the evolution of Franco-African relations in 
the future. 
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Introduction
Nicolas Sarkozy had promised to break with the past. During his presidential cam-
paign, he declared that France would soon turn the page on the trials and tribulations 
of ‘Françafrique’. Addressing the 2010 France-Afrique Summit in Nice following 
his election, he promised that there would be no further French military interventions 
on the continent. Just a few months later, however, Sarkozy – who had come under 
strong criticism for his ministers’ ambiguous ties to the Tunisian and Egyptian re-
gimes – was involved in new wars in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, both of which resulted 
in regime change. In the course of his presidential campaign, François Hollande 
strongly denounced this poorly conceived intervention. With Hollande’s election and 
the left’s return to power, it appeared that a new phase of non-interference would 
soon begin. In January 2013, Hollande nevertheless plunged the French army into a 
new war to rein in the threat of jihadist movements in Northern Mali. Several months 
* Translated from the French by Ethan Rundell. All non-English sources are translated by Ethan Rundell.
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later, riding high on the success of ‘Operation Serval’, France sent troops to support 
UN and African forces in the Central African Republic. In this country, which had 
long been the exclusive preserve of the French army and where Paris had long made 
and unmade governments (e.g., Operation ‘Barracuda’ in 1979), France counted on 
a rapid intervention allowing it to capitalise on its new image as a ‘peace maker’ 
backed by the UN, the African Union and the United States. Lacking any real politi-
cal plan, however, French forces very soon found themselves up against the com-
plexity of the local situation and indirectly contributed to intensifying the massacres 
of Muslims by the Antibalaka militias. In a context marked by the first anniversary 
of the intervention in Mali and growing doubts regarding French action in Kidal and 
Bangui, criticism soon mounted at home and in Africa regarding the ins and outs of 
France’s new policy of armed interference on the continent.
How should the contradictory movements of France’s African intervention pol-
icy be understood? Do France’s bombing of Gaddafi’s 32nd brigade in Benghazi and 
Laurent Gbagbo’s residence in Abidjan, followed by operations Serval in Mali and 
Sangaris in the Central African Republic, indicate that France has returned to its 
old post-colonial role as ‘Africa’s policeman’? Are they evidence of a new doctrine 
of interference in the service of a power strategy forever rooted in the defence of a 
private African ‘preserve’ (and made possible by America’s ‘pivot’ towards Asia)? 
Or are they rather the expression of an incoherent, fluctuating and somewhat ‘schizo-
phrenic’ policy, one defined on an ad hoc basis in the absence of a clear line or genu-
ine strategy and giving rise to ever growing incomprehension on the continent? As 
we shall see, it is the latter hypothesis that seems to prevail for the time being.
And how is one to interpret local reactions to these interventions, which often 
fluctuate between acclamation and radical denunciation? How is one to understand 
the at times disconcerting combination of violent rejections of ‘neo-colonial interfer-
ence’ with requests for intervention often bordering on ‘calls for empire’?1 Unfortu-
nately, we lack the quantitative, comparative and transversal data required to give a 
clear response to this question. By contrast, some information may be gleaned from a 
case study – that of Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) – and qualitative surveys carried out 
in the working class neighbourhoods of Abidjan,2 helping us understand the complex 
relations between a society in conflict and the former colonial Power that militarily 
intervenes in it. In this respect, the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire constitutes an excellent 
‘laboratory’, not only for studying France’s policy of intervening in Africa, but also 
the conflictual redefinition of the ‘collusive transactions’ (Dobry) characteristic of 
the post-colonial relationship.3
And indeed, France’s involvement in this conflict (which formally broke out in 
September 2002 with the rebellion of the New Forces and officially came to an end in 
April 2011 when Laurent Gbagbo was defeated by the bombardments of Operation 
1  See G. Salamé (ed.), Appels d’empire. Ingérences et résistances à l’âge de la mondialisation (Paris: Fayard, 
1996).
2  Since the early 2000s, I have conducted several series of individual and collective surveys – roughly one per 
year – in Abidjan (in the districts of Adjamé, Koumassi, Yopougon, Abobo, Plateau, Cocody) and elsewhere in 
the country on various themes relating to the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and, in particular, the involvement of young 
people in political action and violence. A good portion of these surveys were carried out among the militant 
faction of the Young Patriots. Though they were not initially at the centre of my research, the issue of relations 
between France and Côte d’Ivoire was constantly raised in the interviews.
3  It should be noted that the term “Françafrique” was itself invented by Houphouët-Boigny and was at the time 
assigned a positive connotation.
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Unicorn) gave rise to an unprecedented anti-French mobilisation on the continent, 
following in the lead of the Young Patriots, a pro-Gbagbo group. By focusing on 
French interference in the Ivorian crisis and the reactions it aroused, the discussion 
that follows examines what some have described as a “return to a form of indirect 
administration typical of Franco-African relations”.4 
As its point of departure, the article shows how France’s intervention in Côte 
d’Ivoire is symptomatic of Paris’ changing doctrine and practice of interference on 
the continent. It suggests that the former colonial Power’s politico-military involve-
ment on Ivorian territory might be described as an incoherent and ineffective (albeit 
ultimately successful) ‘yo-yo’ policy. The article then turns to consider this policy 
of interference ‘from below’. Drawing upon interviews conducted among the Young 
Patriots of Abidjan, it examines the ambivalent meaning of their ultranationalist ha-
rangues and the grand narrative of post-colonial emancipation. Beyond their instru-
mental character, I claim, the anti-colonialist and anti-French mobilisations reflect 
major generational upheaval and express deep conflicts of subjectification, them-
selves indicative of a ‘moral war’ between various ‘regimes of truth’. In conclusion, 
the article examines the future of this theme in a context in which the apparatus 
with which it was associated in Côte d’Ivoire has disappeared and France becomes 
involved in new Sub-Saharan wars (Mali, Central African Republic).
Preamble: The Twists and Turns of a Policy of Power(lessness)
Since the mid-1990s, France’s African intervention policy has been in search of co-
herence, hesitating between various options that have never truly been clarified. De-
spite the discourse of  rupture and renewal intoned by various governments of both 
right and left, French policy has remained mired in the uncertainty of unavowed 
arbitrations and choices between, among other things, ‘non-interference’ and ‘non-
indifference’, the temptation to withdraw from the continent and a desire to maintain 
privileged relations there, the tendency towards multilateralism and the desire to re-
tain a policy of bilateral influence, shifting responsibility to African actors and direct 
intervention, outsourcing and ‘subsidiarity’, the modernisation of military coopera-
tion and the perpetuation of the old practices of Françafrique. 
During this period, France has nevertheless embarked on a large scale effort to 
redefine its security policy on the continent, presenting this as the mark of a new, 
modernised and Europeanised ‘African policy’. The commitments made with the 
British at the Saint-Malo Summit were to be its driving force.5 Following in the 
footsteps of other great Powers, which were moving to disengage from the conti-
nent, Paris implemented a new crisis management policy at the end of the 1990s. 
Given the still fresh memory of events in Somalia and Rwanda, Paris wondered 
about the interest and risks of maintaining a strong military presence on the conti-
4  A. Bahi, L’ivoirité mouvementée. Jeunes, médias et politique en Côte d’Ivoire (Bamenda Langaa Editions, 
2013), p. 281.
5  See T. Chafer, G. Cumming, ‘Beyond Fashoda: Anglo-French Security Cooperation in Africa since Saint-
Malo’, International Affairs, 85 (2010), pp. 1129‒1147, and by the same authors, ‘From Rivalry to Partner-
ship? Critical Reflections on Anglo-French Cooperation in Africa’, Review of International Studies, 37 (2011), 
pp. 2439‒3463.
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nent and had set about developing new security cooperation measures. At the time, 
the temptation of withdrawal was on everyone’s mind. It was even reflected in the 
practice of conditioning foreign aid as this was set out in Edouard Balladur’s famous 
‘Abidjan doctrine’ of September 1993, according to which bilateral French ODA 
was to be subordinated to good progress in the structural adjustment programmes 
(SAP) negotiated with multilateral financial institutions. This contrasted with Paris’ 
earlier stance, which had struggled to ‘protect’ the economies of its former ‘back-
yard’ from the neoliberal demands of the ‘Washington consensus’. With the ‘Abidjan 
doctrine’, it was said, France would no longer distinguish between its traditional 
friends and others, with all parties equally subject to ‘multilateralised’ condition-
ality. At the time, generational changes were also taking place within French di-
plomacy and cooperation; new personnel were less inclined than their predecessors 
to see Africa as a necessary condition of French power. Within the administration, 
there was a subdued but real battle between “ancients”, the partisans of maintaining 
privileged ties with the ‘backyard’, and “moderns”,6 who militated for engaging with 
other partners. This was even to be encountered in the corridors of the Elysée, where 
Jacques Chirac, torn between these choices, established two ‘African cells’: a rather 
‘reformist’official one and an unofficial one directed by that permanent fixture of 
French diplomacy, Jacques Foccart.7 Although the cohabitation of these two bodies 
was relatively cordial, it clearly illustrates the ambivalence of a Chiraquien policy 
that hesitated between thoughts of reform and a desire to maintain ‘privileged rela-
tions’ with the continent.
Yet things radically changed in 1997 with Foccart’s death and, above all, the left’s 
victory in legislative elections. When added to the battle already underway between 
‘ancients’ and ‘moderns’ on the right, the new cohabitation government tipped the 
scales in favour of the latter. Arriving at Matignon, Lionel Jospin was rather quick to 
demonstrate his ‘right of review’ and desire to distance himself from the old politics 
of networks on left and right alike. A ‘new French African policy’ was thus unveiled 
by the new government. With militia warfare raging in Brazzaville, it soon had its 
baptism by fire: should the French army intervene? At the time, French troops were 
present in Brazzaville to help evacuate nationals fleeing the war in neighbouring 
Zaire and President Lissouba called upon them to intervene in the conflict between 
his supporters and the militias of Sassou-Nguesso. But France continued to turn a 
deaf ear to his requests and, in a very ostentatious display of neutrality, confined its 
military action to the extraction of French citizens.8 From now on, it was said, Paris 
would no longer systematically assume its traditional role as ‘Africa’s policeman’. 
Although taken under constraint, the decision not to intervene in the Congo was the 
first clear sign to African capitals that there had been a change in policy, especially 
when one considers what Brazzaville represented in the Gaullist imagery regarding 
Franco-African relations. A new, hastily elaborated French crisis management doc-
6  See D. Bourmand, ‘La politique africaine de Jacques Chirac: les anciens contre les modernes’, Modern and 
Contemporary France, special issue, ‘France and Black Africa’, No. 4 (1996), pp. 431‒442; see also the special 
issue of Politique africaine, ‘France-Afrique: la fin du pacte colonial?’, No. 105 (March), 2007.
7  See R. Banégas, R. Marchal, ‘La politique de la France en Afrique sous Jacques Chirac’, in C. Lequesne, M. 
Vaïsse, La politique étrangère de Jacques Chirac (Paris : Riveneuve, 2013), pp. 158‒184.
8  In truth, this stance of withdrawal was coupled with an unofficial policy – outsourced to covert networks, 
private networks (including Elf) and allied states (Angola) – of supporting Sassou Nguesso. This allowed 
Nguesso to gain the upper hand. See P. Yengo, ‘Affinités électives et délégation des compétences: la politique 
congolaise de Jacques Chirac’, Politique africaine, No. 105 (March), 2007, pp. 105‒125.
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trine was established in the form of what I have called the “Jospinien neither-nor”9 
(‘neither interference nor indifference’). Even more so than in the Congo and the 
Central African Republic, where Jospin decided to close military bases in the sum-
mer of 1997, the Côte d’Ivoire was to serve as a testing ground for this new policy. 
Its most striking appearance came with General Gueï’s December 1999 coup d’état. 
While the Élysée’s African cell wanted to fly to the rescue of the ousted President, 
Henri Konan Bédié, the Socialist government decided to remain on the sidelines 
– a powerfully symbolic decision in a country that had until then been considered 
‘France’s showcase’ in Africa.10 This new approach was also reflected in structural 
reforms to the military cooperation policy, which henceforth took the path of multi-
lateralisation, regionalisation and the ‘Africanisation’ of security measures. The RE-
CAMP system (Reinforcing African Peace-Keeping Capacities) was thus presented 
as the new key to regional security, allowing France to withdraw behind the techni-
cal curtain of support for local armies. Military bases as well as defence agreements 
were also called into question, in particular due to endogenous constraints relating to 
the professionalisation of the army.
Nevertheless, starting in the 2000s and especially after the right’s return to power 
in 2002, the pendulum began to swing back towards French military reengagement in 
African conflicts. Following the onset of the New Forces rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire, 
Paris sent more than 5000 men to intervene in the conflict. Refusing to come to the 
aid of the Gbagbo regime by virtue of defence agreements, Operation  Unicorn sup-
ported the UN and froze the front line. The direct involvement of French forces in 
the Ivorian crisis as well as in Chad and the CAR thus seemed to confirm that a shift 
had taken place to a new, much more interventionist doctrine, albeit one that had 
never truly been made explicit. The UK’s military intervention in the Sierra Leone 
conflict in 2000 appeared further proof that former colonial Powers were indeed 
returning to their old habit of intervening in the continent’s affairs.
But it was not to last. Following a new crisis in Côte d’Ivoire in November 2004, 
which saw French forces fighting a loyalist army in the streets of Abidjan while 
Young Patriots targeted French nationals, the French yo-yo policy swung back for 
a third time, with Paris adopting a cautious stance of diplomatic and military with-
drawal sometimes bordering on political impotence and apathy. Operation Unicorn 
was reduced to a minimum and the Abidjan military base was mothballed. From that 
point on, official discourse embraced a position of non-interference. Having led the 
effort to manage the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, France passed its responsibilities off to 
South Africa, with Thabo Mbeki becoming (unsuccessfully) the principal mediator. 
Fearing a new ‘November 2004’, Paris attempted to pursue this cautious policy of 
non-engagement in the first four months of crisis following the 2011 elections. But 
events in the Arab world and stalemate in Côte d’Ivoire’s post-election crisis were to 
bring about a spectacular return to ‘gunboat politics’. 
Faced with the radicalisation of the Ivorian crisis and NATO’s involvement in 
Libya, the French government found itself in an awkward position, criticised in both 
France and Côte d’Ivoire for its ‘double standard’ policy. With France spearheading 
 9  See R. Banégas, R. Marchal, J. Meimon, ‘La fin du pacte colonial?’, Politique africaine, No. 105 (March), 
2007, pp. 7‒26.
10  See S. Smith, ‘La politique d’engagement de la France à l’épreuve de la Côte d’Ivoire’, Politique africaine, 
No. 89 (March), 2003, pp. 112‒126; see also J. Rueff, Côte d’Ivoire. Le feu au pré carré (Paris: Autrement, 
2004).
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the strikes on Gaddafi’s army, how was one to understand the wait-and-see attitude 
it had adopted in Abidjan after the second round of presidential voting? How could 
France on its own initiative pursue an armed intervention at the same time that it 
systematically (and opportunistically) relied on the AU or ECOWAS to provide ‘Af-
rican solutions to African problems’? Should support for democratic processes in 
Africa, even if they are insurrectional or revolutionary, be different on either side of 
the Sahara? After weeks of procrastination, the Élysée finally answered these ques-
tions in early 2011 by heavily engaging the French army alongside pro-Ouattara 
forces in order to bring down the regime of Laurent Gbagbo. This operation came 
as a shock in Côte d’Ivoire and elsewhere in Africa. It also raised huge questions 
that went far beyond the Ivorian framework alone. If civilians had to be protected in 
keeping with UN resolutions, why had France not intervened earlier to prevent the 
blind repression of RHDP (Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie 
et la Paix) street demonstrations, the bombing of the Abobo market and the Duék-
oué massacres? It took more than three months for France and the blue helmets to 
decide to use their mandate to protect the population and secure elections. Very rap-
idly, the political question was raised: could bombing sites of Gbagbo’s power (the 
presidential palace and residence) be justified solely in terms of the need to protect 
civilians or did it rather reflect a partisan shift on the part of Paris in favour of a 
particular camp and figure who was said to have ties to President Sarkozy? France 
had difficulty concealing the contradictions between, on the one hand, an official, 
UN accredited mission and, on the other, the reality of its intervention in support of 
Ouattarist forces incapable of winning on their own. From that point on, and despite 
the election of a new government in 2012, Paris has pursued this new interventionist 
tendency, sending troops first to Mali and then to the Central African Republic. In 
today’s France, right and left seem united in their embrace of a new creed of inter-
ventionism in Africa.
The War Seen from Below: Patriotic and Anti-Colonial 
Mobilisations
How was this policy of French interference perceived in Côte d’Ivoire? In April 
2011, most of Alassane Ouattara’s supporters were relieved to see the deadlock bro-
ken with the help of international forces and their champion finally come to power. 
Since then, they have been nearly unanimous in praising France’s intervention. The 
other side, by contrast, saw it as the ultimate proof of ‘France’s war against the Côte 
d’Ivoire’ and a striking confirmation of Paris’ neo-colonialist ambitions in the Ivo-
rian conflict. Indeed, since the start of the crisis, many Ivorians – those with ties to 
Laurent Gbagbo’s regime as well as simple citizens – have tended to interpret and 
even experience the conflict along agonistic lines as a fight for national liberation 
and a ‘second war of independence’.
Between 2002 and 2011, this rhetoric became the preferred vehicle by which the 
regime, which lacked internal and external support, sought to win legitimacy. It pro-
vided the grist for a veritable state propaganda machine that attributed the origins of 
the rebellion to Chirac and Sarkozy’s France and presented colonial alienation as the 
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source of all of the country’s ills. Alhough he later distanced himself from Laurent 
Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (IPF), the then President of the National Assembly, 
Mamadou Koulibaly, a (free market) economist and herald of the ‘young patriots’, at 
this time established himself as the radical standard bearer of this discourse of libera-
tion. In a widely distributed little tract, he wrote:
“This book is a book of combat and that is why it presents the war that France has decided to 
wage against the Côte d’Ivoire. Wanting to create a modern state is the Ivorians’ only crime. 
…. Freedom has been put on trial for having led to issues not desired by Chirac’s France, 
where it is widely supposed that Africa is still not ready for democracy. African states are 
only good for state corruption, for recycling official development assistance to finance elec-
toral campaigns in France. We only have a choice between cacao plantation democracy and 
the colonial one party state. … No country has friends but all have interests. Côte d’Ivoire 
also has interests that it wishes to secure and see respected by its partners. After this war, 
cooperation will no longer be the same as before. … The destiny of our people is at stake and 
is now being determined. … The people of Côte d’Ivoire have the right to defend themselves 
against any and all aggressors. No one can take away its right to self-determination. … We 
want to once again become free men. Patriots of all parties and nations, let us join forces to 
crusade against those who destabilise our beautiful Côte d’Ivoire. This is not a choice for us. 
It is a vital necessity.”11
The leader of the Alliance of Young Patriots, Charles Blé Goudé, who throughout 
these years of crisis had urged immense crowds to rise up against France, outdid 
himself in a memoir that, in its second edition, included a preface by Aminata Traoré, 
a former Malian minister and prominent figure within the African anti-globalisation 
movement: 
“… I rise up against any country that believes it can make another do its bidding. … This is 
the reason that my comrades and I are fighting for France to respect our sovereignty. I insist 
on the fact that I have nothing against the French. I simply disapprove of the neo-colonial 
methods of their present leaders. I will always refuse this political ‘baby-bottling’, that is, 
Paris’ policy of keeping African countries in a condition of subservience. … An entire conti-
nent on its knees before France! The time of colonies is over! The present leaders of France 
must understand that tomorrow is neither yesterday nor today and that the twenty-first cen-
tury in which we now find ourselves will sound the knell of their retrograde vision rooted in 
the past. We refuse to bend our knee before France, today or tomorrow. … What right does 
that former colonizer have to interfere in our affairs? If we allow them to do so, French lead-
ers will go so far as to decide how we dress and how we behave every day. Jacques Chirac 
and his people have to finally understand that we have grown up and that we want to take 
responsibility for ourselves, that we can and must do so.”12
With President Sarkozy’s April 2011 decision to bomb the positions of the loyalist 
army while their leader, Laurent Gbagbo, took refuge in his bunker in Cocody, this 
anti-colonialist discourse increased tenfold. From that point on, it became a spring-
board for new platforms of transnational mobilisation. Hundreds of articles and open 
letters incessantly denounced the politico-military interference of the former colo-
nial Power.13 These diatribes soon became the stock in trade of an entire fringe of 
11  M. Koulibaly, A. Ahua Jr, G.K. Bush, La Guerre de la France contre la Côte d’Ivoire (Abidjan : La Refonda-
tion, May 2003), pp. 8‒9.
12  C. Blé Goudé, Crise ivoirienne: ma part de vérité (Abidjan : Leaders Team Associated/Frat Mat éditions, 
2006), new edition, pp. 142‒143.
13  Among others, see S. F. Dedy, T. J. Balou Bi (eds.), Election présidentielle en Côte d’Ivoire, ou le pouvoir 
néocolonial dans tous ses états (Paris : L’Harmattan, Présence africaine, 2013); J. Koné Katinan, Côte d’Ivoire, 
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militants, many of them living in exile in Europe or Ghana. These were the words of 
nationalist intellectuals, one would suppose, all the more radical for living outside 
the country. But that was not the entire story. For years, this anti-colonialist reading 
had on a daily basis been thrust to the forefront by the press – whether they were 
the ‘blue papers’ allied with Laurent Gbagbo’s government, the television and radio 
stations under his thumb or the large number of artists (singers, musicians, DJs) who 
were to make a specialty of it with their patriotic ‘zouglou’ and ‘coupé-décalé’ mu-
sic14 and patriotic comic books.15 Championed by an entire universe of activists and 
street mobilisation structures, the anti-colonialist theme quickly achieved hegemony 
in the public sphere. 
It must emphasised be that this rhetoric of national liberation was not exclusive 
to the elite. It is obviously difficult to calculate the size of its audience at home or 
abroad, especially given that its champions were subjected to systematic repression 
following the change of regime in April 2011. Convergent studies have shown that 
this argument had won rather wide acceptance before this date, including among 
those who were not themselves direct supporters of Laurent Gbagbo’s regime.16 
There was of course nothing spontaneous about this: on the contrary, the spread of 
this anti-colonialist theme throughout Ivorian society had been conveyed by a very 
powerful political system, that of the ‘patriotic galaxy’ structures, which consisted of 
hundreds of spaces of mobilisation and ‘popular resistance’. These were hierarchi-
cally organised, reaching from the inner circles of presidential power down to the 
most remote neighbourhoods and regions. The growing number of ‘parliaments’, 
‘agoras’, ‘senates’ and other patriotic ‘congresses’ that appeared in the country fol-
lowing the start of the rebellion in September 2002 played a central role in spreading 
this rhetoric of a ‘second independence struggle’. At the outset, these structures were 
built as spaces of ‘democratic debate’ after the model of the ‘Sorbonne’, which since 
the early 1990s had operated in Plateau’s administrative district as a sort of Ivorian 
answer to Speakers’ Corner of Hyde Park.17 As spaces of discussion, mobilisation 
and political socialisation, these ‘street parliaments’18 gradually established them-
selves as one of the main driving forces of patriotic speech in urban society. In Sep-
tember 2006, with discussions regarding the political transition underway at the UN, 
I attended several debates held by the ‘parliament’ of Yopougon-Sideci, one of the 
country’s largest. Taking the floor in advance of that day’s guest speaker, one of the 
parliament’s regulars, known for his diplomatic talents as ‘Michel Barnier’, warmed 
up the crowd in this way:
l’audace de la rupture (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2013).
14  See A. Schumann, ‘Songs of a New Era: Popular Music and Political Expression in the Ivorian Crisis’, African 
Affairs, 112 (448), 2013, pp. 440‒459; as well as the work of A. Kamaté, La Côte d’Ivoire en crise. Musique 
populaire et pouvoir de 2000 à 2006, Master’s thesis, University of Paris 1 (Department of Political Science), 
2006.
15  See the comic book Côte d’Ivoire. Indépendance économique, l’ultime combat, published in August 2006 by a 
cartoonist nicknamed ‘The Imperial’ and distributed in the streets of Abidjan.
16  See R. Banégas, ‘Côte d’Ivoire: les jeunes ‘se lèvent en hommes’. Anticolonialisme et ultranationalisme chez 
les Jeunes patriotes d’Abidjan’, Les Etudes du CERI, No. 137 (July 2007), pp. 52; G. Koné, Sociogenèse et 
dynamique du mouvement ‘Jeune patriote’, Sociology dissertation, University of Bouaké, 2010 (forthcoming 
under the title La révolte des porteurs de chaises, Abidjan, 2014).
17  See A. Bahi, ‘La ‘Sorbonne’ d’Abidjan: rêve de démocratie ou naissance d’un espace public?’, Revue africaine 
de sociologie, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2003), pp. 47‒63.
18  See R. Banégas, F. Brisset-Foucault, A. Cutolo (eds.), ‘Parlements de la rue. Espaces publics de la parole et 
citoyenneté en Afrique’, special issue of Politique africaine, No. 127 (October 2012).
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“… Everything comes to an end. We decided to fight the battle of Kirina19 because France 
itself won its independence. Even France was invaded and afterwards did away with… the 
invaders. Hitler and the Nazis marched on France. They lunched at the Bastille. We weren’t 
there… but we know your history. So they marched on France. And General de Gaulle called 
for resistance from London… he called for resistance. In the same way, President Laurent 
Gbagbo calls upon us… to resist. And today you describe us as patriots in the pay of President 
Laurent Gbagbo. We are not… in the pay of President Laurent Gbagbo. We are resistance 
fighters. That’s what we are! We are resistance fighters in the pay of our Republic… which is 
now being tormented by the colonists of yesteryear. (applause). We are resistance fighters… 
Here, no one has a weapon here. We are going to disarm France with speech… With speech… 
we are going to disarm France. We’re going to put an end to all that… and we’re going to 
cooperate now with France as equals. The time of lucrative contracts – contracts costing just 
one, symbolic franc – with the Bouygues family is over. Now, we’ll take bids. Thabo Mbeki 
comes with his briefcase, Vladimir Poutine, Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, George Bush, every-
one! With all our petroleum, how much do you offer? South Africa, 44%, ok, you can wait a 
little; France 20%: get at the back of the line; Russia 50%, the United States 52%, that works, 
sold! (applause). That’s how we’re now going to negotiate and sell to the highest bidder. 
We’re now going to sell to the highest bidder because it’s not normal that we should be poor 
in a rich country… President Gbagbo decided to put an end to all that. We let the presidential 
palace that you see in Plateau there, we let it. We let it to France. The presidential palace, the 
hall of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister’s residence, the ministerial compound, the 
Vridi shipping terminal… it was all rented out. And we paid money to France. And President 
Gbagbo Laurent came and he said: ‘Ok, your rental agreement is with Houphouët Boigny… 
Your rental agreement is with Houphouët Boigny.’ … Even the roads were rented out. Who 
knows, maybe even the French language I am speaking is rented (laughter and applause). 
In any case, true independence, we haven’t had that, we were lied to. We weren’t independ-
ent. We were free with our feet in chains, closely supervised by the master. Before, could we 
speak before the master? We trembled. Now we greet one another: hello, how are you? Many 
things have changed and true democracy has now begun to emerge.”20
Listening to this harangue, it becomes clear that the violence of the ultra-nationalist 
discourse embraced by the Young Patriots reflects long-standing and very profound 
alienation within Ivorian society. Like many of its neighbours in francophone Africa, 
the Côte d’Ivoire never truly cut the umbilical cord with the ‘motherland’. This oft-
denounced ‘osmotic’ relationship was more pronounced in Côte d’Ivoire than else-
where due to President Houphouët Boigny’s choice – at once political, economic and 
strategic – to remain in the fold of the former colonial Power. Following independ-
ence, the ‘old man’ defended the Community option and the maintenance of close 
ties with Paris against the advocates of pan-Africanism. In contrast to his neighbour 
Nkrumah, he built up his country’s wealth by strengthening these relations in all 
domains: military, economic, political and cultural. For Côte d’Ivoire, independence 
was little more than a flag: all prerogatives of sovereignty were exercised by the 
French, the country’s security was assured, not by a national army, but rather by the 
43rd Bima (bataillon d’infanterie de marine), the better part of the economy was in 
the hands of French interests and the highest reaches of the state administration were 
staffed by French ‘énarques’.
19  A famous battle in the course of which Sundiata Keita, the founder of the Mandinka Empire, defeated the tyrant 
Soumahoro Kanté.
20  Remarks gathered at the Yopougon-Sidéci Parliament, Wednesday 20 September 2006. For the full text of the 
speech, see R. Banégas, ‘La France et l’ONU devant le “parlement” de Yopougon. Paroles de Jeunes patriotes 
et régimes de vérité à Abidjan’, Politique africaine, No. 104 (December 2006), pp. 141‒158.
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The force with which nationalist sentiment was expressed throughout these years 
of crisis is obviously related to this history of alienated sovereignty and reflects long-
standing demands for a second independence.21 So much is well known. Less well 
known is the relationship between this contemporary mobilisation and the earliest 
stirrings of the anti-colonialist narrative in the first hours of independence. With 
their attention focused on the rent economy and the political alliance with Paris, 
Houphouët and his people knowingly neglected any historical reference that might 
have united, as elsewhere, a backwater nationalism. In the 1950s and 60s, nationalist 
movements were the object of ferocious repression, as was the Guébié secession-
ist mobilisation, which expressed a clearly anti-colonialist discourse in native ac-
cents. This movement, which some of Laurent Gbagbo’s troops still claim to follow 
– Gbagbo himself is a native of Gagnoa (the region of the Guébié) and a historian 
of nationalism – was violently crushed with French support. With the crisis of the 
2000s, Kragbé Gnagbé enjoyed something of a renaissance thanks to a new national-
ist historiography that presented him as a hero of the anti-French resistance.22 Taken 
alone, the strong resurgence in public discussion of painful episodes such as that of 
the Guébié indicates that the virulence of the pro-Gbagbo patriotic mobilisations 
doubtless also had something to do with this long eclipsed nationalist memory. The 
role played by extraversion and françafricain ‘consanguinity’ in the formation of the 
Ivorian state and economy has led many Ivorians to believe that they still suffer from 
a ‘deficit of self-representation’.23 In classic fashion, this conflict, which expressed 
itself in terms of national liberation and a second independence, partly made up for 
it.
National Liberation, Anti-Colonialism and Generational 
Emancipation
As soon as the war began in 2002, the Young Patriots of Abidjan provided shock 
troops for Laurent Gbagbo’s government. Mobilised by the government, which 
handsomely remunerated their leaders, the Young Patriots played a pivotal role in 
the very ambivalent and conflictual relationship with France. Proof of this is to be 
found in the violent demonstrations that took place following the Marcoussis ac-
cords in January 2003 as well as those of November 2004, in the course of which 
French forces fired on the crowd in the streets of Abidjan and a large number of 
French nationals left the country. In January 2006, patriotic militias once again took 
centre stage to challenge the UN and violently resisted the pro-Outtara uprising and 
blue helmet patrols during the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. Recruited in large 
numbers and armed and trained by loyalist forces, these militias represented a for-
midable system of social and political control in the service of the regime.24 The 
21  See H.-M. Yéré, Citizenship, Nationality and History in Côte d’Ivoire, 1929‒1999, PhD Thesis, Université de 
Bâle, 2010.
22  See J. Gadji Dagbo, L’Affaire Kragbé Gnagbé. Un autre regard 32 ans après (Abidjan, Nouvelles éditions 
ivoiriennes, 2002).
23 After the expression of Ousmane Dembélé (personal communication).
24  See R. Banégas, ‘A Warrior Generation? Political Violence and Subjectivation of Young Militiamen in Côte 
d’Ivoire’, in N. Duclos (ed.), War Veterans in Postwar Situations: Chechnya, Serbia, Turkey, Peru, and Côte 
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spread of ‘parliaments’, ‘agoras’ and ‘senates’ throughout all neighbourhoods of the 
economic capital also reflected a desire to control the urban territory. This movement 
rapidly gained ground in the large towns of the South as well as in rural areas where 
the leaders of the patriotic galaxy, with the government’s encouragement and finan-
cial support, helped build analogous organisations. In the first years of the conflict, 
the patriotic movement thus experienced a meteoric rise and impressive growth in 
the zone controlled by the government. In retrospect, it can even be argued that the 
Young Patriots saved the regime from collapse and above all allowed it to resist the 
various demands of the international community. Indeed, this mobilisation played a 
crucial role in the regime’s efforts to resist pressure from France, the UN Security 
Council and the African Union to reach a power-sharing agreement. 
In fact, one might make do with an instrumentalist reading of this anti-colonialist 
movement, which to a very large extent obeyed the regime’s orders. On this view, the 
patriotic mobilisation was ultimately just a device to mask the real social, economic 
and political interests of the Young ‘ventriotes’25, who employed nationalist logor-
rhea to advance their interests. There is obviously much evidence to support this in-
terpretation. The luxurious lifestyle of the leaders of the ‘patriotic galaxy’ – Charles 
Blé Goudé, Konaté Navigué, Eugène Djué and others – suggests that ultranationalist 
politics had in the space of a few years become a powerful vector of economic ac-
cumulation and social upward mobility. It has also been noted that, among lower 
ranking members of the movement, involvement in the patriotic galaxy could prove 
profitable. Many young activists succeeded in selling their engagement in exchange 
for a favour – in particular, their ‘admission’ to a civil service competition and pro-
fessional integration into the administration. Indeed, at all levels of the movement, 
patriotic mobilisation was inseparable from activist strategies for capturing rents on 
the classic model of the ‘politics of the belly’.26
My surveys nevertheless prove that the patriotic mobilisation cannot be reduced 
to its ‘alimentary’ dimension alone and that its commodification does not amount to 
a political economy of material remuneration. The luxurious lifestyle of the move-
ment’s leaders has blinded observers to the relative poverty of their troops. Yet the 
latter nevertheless mobilised on behalf of the nationalist cause, sometimes even pay-
ing to attend the debates that took place daily in Abidjan’s Plateau district at the 
‘Sorbonne’ or in the neighbourhood agoras. As with any mobilisation, anti-coloni-
alist or otherwise, the Young Patriots were also motivated by social imaginaries and 
networks of sociability. These had been profoundly affected by the generalisation 
of violence. My argument27 is that underlying sociological dynamics – in particular, 
the individual and collective struggle for youth emancipation championed by a new 
generation of activists – fuelled support for the anti-colonialist rhetoric of the ‘sec-
ond war of independence’.
At the individual level, biographical interviews with activists in the service of 
the patriotic cause indicate that these young people saw the anti-colonialist cause as 
a source of self-empowerment. The discourse of national liberation served another 
d’Ivoire (London: Palgrave, 2012), pp. 241‒266.
25  A pun referring to the Young Patriots’ greed and predatory activities. The expression, “la politique du ventre” 
(the politics of the belly), is commonly used in reference to prebendal politics in Africa. See J.-F. Bayart, The 
State in Africa : The Politics of the Belly (London: Longman, 1993).
26 Ibid. On the various ways in which patriotic mobilisation was sold, see the dissertation of G. Koné.
27  Which I have presented elsewhere: see R. Banégas, ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Patriotism, Ethnonationalism and Other 
Modes of Self-Writing’, African Affairs, Vol. 105, No. 421 (2006), pp. 535‒552.
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form of emancipatory struggle, at once generational, familial, communitarian, eco-
nomic and, ultimately, political. In this sense, the discourse regarding France and its 
colonial heritage was not merely cover for the mercenary attitude of ‘ventriotes’ or 
simply a reflection of state propaganda. In what had come to resemble a true gen-
erational revolution, it was also the preferred rhetoric for expressing self-affirmation 
and the demand for rights. As a young speaker at the Yopougon parliament named 
A.S. put it: 
“My name is A.S. I’m from Northern Côte d’Ivoire; I’m Senufo and Christian. … And my 
position in the crisis is all the more… complex given that it’s my parents who in practice 
are… involved in what’s happening. So I can’t take the same stance as those who are here. 
Because at home people are dying, there isn’t any medicine, there isn’t any drinking water, 
… I think about my parents but at the same time I know that the fight will lead me… towards 
freedom. … We’re in the process… we’re in this fight because…, in fact, we’re a new gen-
eration, we’re a new generation and we think that… those who taught democracy, those who 
taught us freedom, we’re only asking them for a single thing: our right to exist as a nation and 
our, our right to freely choose those who rule us. That’s the… the problem we have. But those 
who colonised us, I mean France, were perhaps a little surprised because maybe it didn’t 
notice that the baby had grown up; I mean, we went too fast, so maybe the master hadn’t 
expected that the student would learn so quickly and now wants to be like the master.  … 
France has to accept… us with our way of thinking, people have to respect our choices. … 
People must be allowed to express themselves …. So people have to allow us to express 
ourselves. We want to collaborate with them; France after all is the leading partner in the 
development of… Côte d’Ivoire. The last time I was surprised to see the ambassador come to 
say that Côte d’Ivoire represented 0.008% of [French] cooperation in the world. We say “fine, 
if we are nothing to you, let us be then.” That’s it, if you think that we’re nothing in your 
eyes then give us back our freedom. And then when we realise we can’t live without you, 
we’ll come to see you again. It’s as simple as that. But we’re forced to collaborate. We can 
perhaps understand that our great grandparents perhaps signed agreements because I have an 
Italian friend who told me one day after we had left a demonstration, he said “but, Soro, do 
you know why you are fighting”; I told him, “we’re fighting for our freedom.” He said “but 
what freedom are you talking about?”; I said “our freedom, that means we want to be able to 
make our own choices.” He said “but perhaps people sold your Côte d’Ivoire before you were 
born”;  I said “but the debate isn’t about that”. … Because real freedom can’t be given away. 
Freedom is something you fight over. Because my Italian friend told me, other countries won 
their independence by fighting for it; “you, your independence was… given to you. But what 
was your independence given in exchange for?” I couldn’t answer this question because ob-
viously I knew he was right.”
Extending these remarks in a discussion of how his involvement with the movement 
affected relations with his family, he added:
“All that so as not to depend on someone. So that no one can dictate our behaviour. That’s it. 
… But I have to say that it was hard at the beginning because when we came at the beginning 
of the parliament, parents treated us as children who didn’t want to do anything, who just 
came to kill time… to defend those who are already doing well. But over time we ultimately 
convinced them that without this fight we would be nothing and that the investment they had 
made would be wasted because we wouldn’t be able to look after them. People should have 
a good wage, everyone should have a job… but we know that only the fight can give all that, 
it’s the fight that we are pursuing now.”28
28 Interview, Abidjan (Yopougon), September 2006.
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Another ‘professional’ patriotic orator, ‘Professor Echo’, reiterated these sentiments 
in recounting the day his parents – Methodist protestants “who had never thought 
that I would take a position in politics, much less become a public figure” – saw 
him mount the podium at the “All Powerful Congress of Abobo”. This affected his 
relations with his father: “I continue to depend on him today… when it comes to 
managing the situation. When I’m a bit in a confused situation, I consult him. So he 
has become a consultant for me (laughter).”29
In light of these intimate and microsociological battles, the ultranationalist mobi-
lisation of patriotic youth against France and its local henchmen can therefore also be 
interpreted as the symbolic vector of a struggle for empowerment and subjectifica-
tion among young people. By the violence of their discourse and – for many of them 
– their involvement in militias, they were attempting to win a place for themselves 
in the public sphere as a fully-fledged political category. Indeed, the crisis of the 
2000s witnessed ever greater assertiveness on the part of young activists who ‘stood 
up as men’ to shake off the yoke of generational relations and claim their place in 
society. This process of empowerment and emancipation is of course neither new nor 
uniquely related to the conflict but the war did accelerate it, propelling some activ-
ist segments of the urban and rural youth population to the forefront of the political 
arena. Aspiring to power without, in Yacouba Konaté’s phrase, “being wallflowers”, 
30 many of these young patriots were influenced by their experience of the political 
culture of violence within student unions, where disagreements were already being 
resolved by ‘machettage’ and armed confrontation. Recruited for their part among 
the ‘strongmen’ of the ghettos and idle youth of the suburbs, the vast majority of rank 
and file troops also used this violence as a tool of social vengeance. The looting that 
accompanied the November 2004 mobilisations and the subsequent victory of Alas-
sane Ouattara’s troops in 201131 clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Ultranationalist 
rhetoric was thus combined with that of looting within a single matrix centred on 
the appropriation of property and the assertion of rights. This matrix was itself sub-
sumed under what Achille Mbembé has called an “unprecedented culture of liberty 
as a form of domination” and accumulation. “This domination”, he adds, “consists 
in taking, appropriating and profiting in keeping with a vision that likens the life of 
the individual to a game of chance in which the temporal horizon is dominated by 
the present. The liberty to trespass upon others and their belongings does not only 
partake of a particular power struggle. It also partakes of a lifestyle and aesthetic.”32 
“That’s the Truth!” Conflicts of Subjectification and  
Regimes of Truth
Yet it would be mistaken to interpret the anti-colonial patriotic mobilisations solely 
in terms of juvenile emancipation, even when crossed with the libertarian aesthetic 
29 Interview, Abidjan (Yopougon), September 2006.
30  See Y. Konaté, “Les enfants de la balle. De la Fesci aux mouvements de patriotes”, Politique africaine, No. 89 
(March 2003), pp. 49‒70. 
31  See G. Koné, ‘Logiques sociales et politiques des pillages et barrages dans la crise post-électorale en Côte 
d’Ivoire’, Politique africaine, No. 121 (June 2011), pp. 145‒160.
32 A. Mbembé, ‘A propos des écritures africaines de soi’, Politique africaine, No. 77 (June 2000), p. 42. 
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of violent domination to which Mbembé refers. As I have shown elsewhere,33 this 
‘patriotic subjectification’ should be understood from the perspective of an ambiva-
lent process of subjection in the twofold, Foucauldian sense of the term:34 affirmation 
of a moral and political subject in and by subordination to a very burdensome and 
constraining social and institutional framework. Indeed, the dynamic of generational 
self-assertion championed by the Young Patriots movement remained very equivocal 
and subject to powerful systems of internal and external patronage. In this respect, it 
can be argued that the anti-colonialist mobilisation against France was also a moral 
war that reflected very profound conflicts of subjectification pitting various ‘regimes 
of truth’ against one another.
It is no coincidence that the harangues of patriotic speakers and the songs of 
zouglou and coupé-décalé were constantly punctuated with the slogan: ‘That’s the 
truth!’ Indeed, among the young activists in the agoras and parliaments of the ‘patri-
otic galaxy’, the process of subjectification took place by way of a hermeneutic effort 
to ‘reveal’ the truth expressed by public speaking.35 In addition to the central task of 
wartime mobilisation, the street parliaments were also given the duty of ‘governing 
of souls’.36 In the peculiar situation of ‘neither war nor peace’ that long prevailed, it 
was necessary to help people ‘withstand the fears’ of war and ‘stand tall’ in adversity. 
As one of the Sorbonne and Yop’ Sideci speakers put it, this presumed that those 
who ran the agoras were capable of “explaining” to ordinary people “what has really 
happened in the country since 2002”.37 All of the speakers I interviewed claimed that 
they had shouldered a major responsibility in the crisis: in explaining the situation, 
they enacted a ‘maieutics’ serving to ‘raise awareness’ and construct citizen resist-
ance. In particular, this involved countering the ‘lies’ and counter-truths peddled by 
international media outlets, such as Radio France Internationale and France 24, so 
that Ivorians might become the subjects of their own history. The Young Patriots’ 
heavy investment in knowledge, understanding and the quest for ‘truth’ must be un-
derstood in the context of this duty to ‘regenerate the nation’ and ‘stand up as men’ 
against colonial plots to dispossess the self.
The very structure of the patriotic agoras testifies to the importance conferred 
upon the question of veridiction. A certain ‘division of intellectual labour’ was to 
be observed among the speakers in ‘street parliaments’, with various domains of 
knowledge parcelled between ‘specialists’: the ‘political analyst’ who deciphered the 
news of the day and revealed the strategies employed by ‘foreign Powers’ to subju-
gate the Ivorian nation; the self-proclaimed ‘historian’ who used anamnesis to draw 
connections between the history of colonial domination and the 2002 rebellion; the 
‘expert economist’ who drew upon technical arguments to show how the West – and, 
in particular, large French firms – plundered national and continental resources; the 
‘mystical professor’ who mixed spiritual sources of various provenance (including 
Pentecostalism) in an effort to convince his flock at the ‘Sorbonne’ that ‘to be happy, 
33  See R. Banégas, ‘La politique du “gbonhi”. Mobilisations patriotiques, violence milicienne et carrières mili-
tantes en Côte d’Ivoire’, Genèses, No. 81 (December 2010), pp. 25‒44.
34 See M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité. La Volonté de savoir. Volume I (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), p. 81.
35  See Armando Cutolo, ‘Le retour de Gbagbo. Jeunes patriotes, herméneutique de l’Histoire et subjectivation 
religieuse’, in F. Viti (ed.), La Côte d’Ivoire, d’une crise à l’autre (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2013).
36  See R. Banégas, A. Cutolo, ‘Gouverner par la parole. Parlements de la rue, pratiques oratoires et subjectivation 
politique en Côte d’Ivoire’, Politique africaine, No. 127 (October 2012), pp. 21‒48. The section that follows 
borrows from this article. I would like to thank my co-author.
37 Interview, Abidjan, 30 June 2007.
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the poor must win the battle of spiritual decolonisation’ and so on.38 In this cognitive 
system, every domain of social and political life, every event past or present, was 
made to fit into a hermeneutic scheme based on the principle that emancipation was 
to be had by unveiling the ‘truth’. What was at stake in this arrangement was the 
possibility of transmuting Ivorians – and, more broadly, Africans – into the active 
subjects of a new regime of historicity.39
From the perspective of the present discussion, what matters here is that this 
hermeneutic effort of subjectification first and foremost took place by way of an ef-
fort to break with colonial history and its heritage. In contrast to the academic world, 
where this issue was long passed over in silence, historiographical critique was om-
nipresent within the patriotic agoras. With the celebration of the fiftieth-anniversary 
of independence in 2010, it assumed particular salience:
“The truth is always comparable, ok. The truth is by nature comparable. Because there’s the 
lie and then there’s the truth. … For example, when Sarkozy now says that he wants to cel-
ebrate the fiftieth-anniversary of African countries and there is an official mission and people 
say that…  … We won’t be ready to accept this lie. Because, yes, we say that colonization 
brought us many things, Western knowledge and scientific development, schools, etc. Those 
are real thoughts. But we aren’t going to accept a fiftieth-anniversary in which France is pre-
sented like the Angel Gabriel who brought us salvation through Mary who had the child in 
her belly and the negative side of things is concealed by the wonders of French diplomacy. 
We won’t accept that. … We’re going to express our fiftieth-anniversary. We are going to 
speak about the positive effects of colonization and the harmful effects of colonization. … 
Since Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech in Senegal at Sheikh Anta Diop University, I’ve understood 
that we’ve been taught nothing about the truth. … The French told us that, as if by magic, the 
transhumance of people in Côte d’Ivoire took place in the fifteenth- and sixteenth-centuries. 
As if there was a territory there, a square, no one lived there and the trumpets are blown and 
there, ponponpon, the peoples enter. It’s a pure lie. It’s true that movements have taken place 
in the world. But to set the history of Côte d’Ivoire in that framework… It’s true that we 
haven’t written our history and that other people have given us our history. This history must 
be rewritten. That’s the truth. And that’s what the fiftieth-anniversary will be.”40 
“No one is going to come and tell us anything other than what people will simply accept. That 
won’t work anymore. We’re going to tell people the truth. And the truth, it’s not brutality. … 
Galileo, because he told the truth, they said he blasphemed and they killed him. But it turns 
out to be true today. … Because the truth depends on the period. As soon as the common run 
of people can’t recognize what you say as the truth, it’s taken for a lie, until the common run 
of people understands and discovers for itself that what you said was true. That’s when the 
truth takes hold. That’s the truth. The truth comes from an individual who is challenged and 
even excluded from society before the common run of people accept science.”41
This search for the truth was not mere intellectual speculation on the part of young 
dropouts who saw it as an opportunity to make a name for themselves. For those who 
made a vocation of it, it was also an effort applied to one’s self, a “hemeneutics of the 
subject” submitted to a discipline that in some respects made the Young Patriots the 
38  In the words of Simplice Decho, known as ‘Mystic’, a ‘tenured professor’ of the Sorbonne, interview, Abidjan, 
12 February 2010.
39  See A. Cutolo, ‘Regimi di verità. Nazionalismo, anticolonialismo e afrocentrismo nella galaxie patriotique in 
Costa d’Avorio”, Luomo, 2011, I‒II, pp. 235‒259.
40 S.B., orator of Yopougon’s Sideci parliament, 13 February 2010.
41 ‘Michel Barnier’, interview, Abidjan, 12 February 2010.
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“parrhesians”42 of the Ivorian crisis. By observing the patriotic agoras and listening 
to the speeches made there, one could assess the degree to which the interpretive and 
truth-telling duty claimed by speakers played an important role. These young people 
had seized a power that historically devolves upon elders or the institutions of the 
‘theologian-state’.43 Bolstered by their control of the street, they cobbled together 
their own, very empirical and often confused historical ‘knowledge’. This was nour-
ished by a close reading of the press and, above all, a constant effort to set matters in 
geographical and historical perspective. They ‘decrypted’ reality through compari-
son and analogy with other situations and other times and in this way constructed 
their own regime of historicity. This process was central to their denunciations of 
the colonialist designs of France, whose ‘plots’ had to be decrypted. Indeed, ‘Jack 
Bauer’, S.B. and ‘Barnier’, three of the Yopougon ‘parliament speakers mentioned 
above, even formalised this technique in what they referred to as ‘diapos’:
“By reading so much, one makes diapos. These diapos allow us to see all of the scheming. 
For us, the diapo, it’s… for example, you see a sentence that says this: Dadis Camara was 
shot by his aide-de-camp. And after the assassination attempt against Dadis Camara, you see 
Wade who goes out and comes with a helicopter to look for Dadis to bring him back. You 
take this image, you automatically compare it with the actions, you reflect the image and 
its action in our crisis. How did Abdoulaye Wade behave in Côte d’Ivoire during the crisis. 
What was his position? Automatically, that allows us to see that it is not a chance action but 
rather premeditated. That’s what we call the diapo, the comparativity of the actions that take 
place in other countries in regards to the Ivorian crisis. It’s the comparative reading of other 
actions that took place here with actions that happened elsewhere. That’s what we call the 
diapo. They’re projections, you know…  … We use the past. For us, the past is the diapo. 
That what our diapo is. What happened before and clings to what is happening now, that’s 
what the diapo is for us.”44
This hermeneutics of comparison and historical analogy help us to understand the 
ambivalent process of subjectification among patriotic speakers and the complexity 
of their relationship with France. Although characterised by a virulent rejection of 
external interference, the ‘African writings of the self’ (Mbembé) promoted by these 
speakers were the work of clearly globalised subjects45 who were very much aware 
of what was happening in the world and eager to take their place in it.46 Behind the 
old theories of colonial conspiracy was a fundamentally counter-hegemonic desire to 
give another meaning to the world that surrounded them, to set it in another regime 
of truth and historicity. This activity of ‘deciphering’ is crucial to understanding 
what became of the agoras and street parliaments over time. The Young Patriots who 
crowded into these spaces claimed a power of exposure and revelation that in some 
respects paralleled prophetic and exegetical activities.47 By virtue of the privileged 
place they occupied in the patriotic galaxy  structures, they presented themselves as 
the authorised interpreters of power and its shadows:
42  M. Foucault, Le courage de la vérité. Le gouvernement de soi et les autres II. Cours au collège de France, 1984 
(Paris : Gallimard Seuil, 2009).
43 To borrow the expression of Achille Mbembé, Afriques indociles (Paris: Karthala, 1988). 
44 “Michel Barnier”, interview, Abidjan, 8 February 2010.
45 See J.-F. Bayart, Global Subjects: A Political Critique of Globalization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
46  On this subject, see J. Ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Durham & London: 
Duke University Press, 2006).
47  See J.&J. Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution Vol I: Christianity, Colonialism and Consciousness in South 
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“You know, in Côte d’Ivoire and in this parliament, as the Bible says, I’m the shepherd, my 
flock knows my voice. When our President of the Republic speaks, we know what he’s talk-
ing about. If he addresses us, we know it; if he speaks to someone else, we know it. Because 
he has trained us. He said one thing: “What I say isn’t what you are to understand.” … [Presi-
dent Gbagbo] made a speech here in Côte d’Ivoire and we spent eleven days deciphering the 
head of state’s speech because we had difficulties ourselves. And we had to meet in session 
to understand that he wasn’t addressing Ivorians. … So we spent eleven days. We had to 
photocopy this speech and everyone went home, laid down and deciphered until we met one 
Sunday at the parliament in an annex room, all in a tangle, because we were going to talk to 
the people and the people were very worried because the head of state’s speech had not been 
understood by the people. … This was after [the peace agreements of] Accra III. I said that 
we were wearing ourselves out for nothing. The chief of state’s speech was not for us. Look 
at what he said. He said: ‘Dear friends of Côte d’Ivoire, my fellow countrymen…’ So it was 
the international community he was addressing, not us. And when we met in plenary session 
and made our presentation, the various remarks of the various speakers who were there were 
met with cheers and they all went happily home. We finally succeeded in deciphering the 
President’s message … As initiates, we had already understood.”48
This issue of revelation by ‘initiates’ was a central dimension of the framework of 
patriotic governmentality. In the agoras, the grand narrative of nationalist emancipa-
tion was often expressed in the language of religious deliverance. This ‘deliverance’ 
closely blended the rhetoric of ‘born again’ faith with the revolutionary ideology of 
the IPF and Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI) activists 
who ran the agoras.49 Pentecostal pastors, in particular, played a prominent role in 
the agoras, occupying certain slots reserved for ‘mystical affairs’. The vocabulary of 
revival churches was also to be encountered in the harangues of patriotic speakers. 
A large portion of the speeches made before street parliaments were thus devoted to 
interpreting what the speakers referred to as the ‘religious aspect of the crisis’. This 
interest in mystical interpretation may appear far removed from the matter at hand. 
And yet it is central. For it was only by unveiling the ‘true meaning’ of the Ivorian 
crisis as it was revealed by the struggle against the rebellion and colonial France that 
the nation would recognise the sign of its divine election.50 This religious hermeneu-
tic of the conflict was expressed by means of a specific lexicon that quickly became 
hegemonic in the street parliaments. There, northern rebels were depicted not only 
as ‘terrorists’ in the service of France and imperialist interests but also in the guise 
of demons, sorcerers sent by evil outside forces to ‘eat’ the sovereign body and loot 
national resources. The resistance of the Young Patriots was thus presented as a ‘war 
against sorcery’, a divine test intended to liberate the Ivorian people – even the entire 
‘African black race’, as one pastor who frequented the agoras told me – from its evil 
spells and lead it towards genuine deliverance on Earth and beyond. In this narrative 
of a mystical battle for deliverance, French military intervention occupied a central 
place.
This soteriological and, in many respects, eschatological reading of the Ivorian 
crisis was popularised by pastors in the agoras, reiterated ad nauseam by speakers 
48 ‘Jack Bauer’, interview, Abidjan, 8 February 2010.
49  See A. Mary, ‘Prophètes pasteurs. La politique de la délivrance en Côte d’Ivoire’, Politique africaine, No. 87 
(October 2002), pp. 69‒94; R. Banégas, ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Patriotism, Ethnonationalism and Other Modes of Self-
Writing’, op. cit.
50  A. Cutolo, ‘Regimi di verità. Nazionalismo, anticolonialismo e afrocentrismo nella galaxie patriotique in Cos-
ta d’Avorio’, L’Uomo, 2011, 1-2, pp. 235‒259. 
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and very broadly disseminated among the public (through publications as well as the 
audio and video recordings on offer at patriotic market stalls). This gave rise to a to-
talising and all-encompassing discursive regime, a producer of ‘truths’ of formidable 
performative power in this great many-sided battle against the Other, whether it be 
the foreign assailant, the imperialist exploiter, the colonialist predator or one’s own 
next-door neighbour. These truths were constructed around guided interpretations 
linking apparently distant events into a structure of meaning. If the nation’s destiny 
was to be realised, the signs of God had to be recognised in this structure. Beyond 
their banal, anti-French harangues, this was the highly exegetical and performative 
mission to which the patriotic speakers of the Sorbonne, Yop’-Sideci and the All 
Powerful Congress of Abobo had devoted themselves. Their defeat, with the fall of 
Laurent Gbagbo in April 2011, did not destroy this alternative regime of truth. Quite 
the contrary: the fact that Alassane Ouattara came to power on the back of rebel 
forces and the French army powerfully confirmed the interpretive framework of a 
‘post-colonial conspiracy’.
Conclusion. The Difficult Renegotiation of Franco-African 
Relations: Between ‘Calls for Empire’ and the ‘Colonial Whip’
Following the victory of the Ouattara camp in 2011, the Abidjan ‘Sorbonne’ was 
razed by bulldozers and all of the neighbourhood agoras were dismantled. The 
speakers who carried the flame of the struggle against France and its local allies 
have disappeared from the scene or migrated into other activities (particularly within 
new churches). Indeed, three years after the fall of Laurent Gabgbo’s regime, the 
nationalist and anti-colonialist theme seems to have completely disappeared from 
the landscape. In its place, the notions of ‘emergence’ and Franco-Ivorian ‘reunion’ 
now seem to be the order of the day. As soon as the guns fell silent, Prime Minister 
François Fillon hastened to Abidjan (July 2011) with a large delegation of business-
men in order to resume cooperation and trade between the two countries. In January 
2012, Nicolas Sarkozy invited President Ouattara to Paris for a lavish state visit. 
The very pomp with which this took place testifies to the desire of the two leaders 
– who are, moreover, personal friends – to turn the page on the years of crisis and 
resume close ties. And in July 2014, François Hollande was received on the banks 
of the Ébrié Lagoon for an official visit. In fact, armed intervention is not the only 
form of assistance that France has provided Alassane Ouattara. It also supplies him 
with major financial support, including an agreement to supply more than 2.5 bil-
lion Euros in C2D funds (Debt-Reduction-Development Contract) – the largest such 
grant ever bestowed by a French cooperation programme – to help with the country’s 
reconstruction. Nearly all state sectors – infrastructure, youth, education, agriculture, 
transportation – benefit from French support (as well as that supplied by other spon-
sors, including the EU). The French army is also heavily involved in the reform of 
the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire. In little time, bilateral tension and armed 
interference have thus turned into an official honeymoon.
How is this abrupt reversal to be understood? Although there are no available fig-
ures to this effect, it should be stressed that the anti-French mobilisation discussed in 
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this article was not unanimously supported by the population. Many ordinary Ivori-
ans did not necessarily recognise themselves in the grand patriotic narrative. Cham-
pioned by an activist minority and an effective system of mobilisation, this narrative 
was in large part exploited for its own ends by a regime lacking in internal support 
and under external pressure. It may be presumed that the supporters of Alassane 
Ouattara, who received a majority of the votes cast in the December 2010 election, 
had an entirely different perception of France’s policy of interfering in the Ivorian 
crisis. Indeed, many welcomed the bombs dropped from French helicopters which, 
in April 2011, permitted Laurent Gbagbo’s arrest. But these contrasting perceptions 
should not be reduced to a simplistic opposition between two partisan camps. My 
surveys among supporters of the two sides indicate that, trained in the same student 
union networks as their IPF counterparts, many young pro-Ouattara activists shared 
similar convictions in regards to post-colonial alienation. As we saw above, the calls 
for a ‘second war of independence’ loudly and clearly proclaimed in patriotic agoras 
were the preferred rhetoric for expressing a dynamic of generational emancipation. 
The halting but real process by which anti-colonialist rhetoric is employed in the 
service of the political subjectification of young people is not limited to a particular 
party or even a particular partisan camp; it cuts across an entire generation of young 
Ivorians (and, more broadly, Africans) whose prospects for the future remain bleak. 
The ‘calls for empire’51 that arose in the last phase of the conflict were in fact deeply 
ambivalent. They went hand in hand with a desire to put Franco-Ivorian (and, more 
generally, African) relations on a new, more egalitarian and less paternalist footing.
Today, as in the time of Houphouët, Paris and Abidjan are once again key strate-
gic partners and no forum remains for anti-colonialist discourse. Brushed under the 
carpet of a ‘national reconciliation’ that is at once factitious and unilateral, this theme 
has been crushed under the weight of a new hegemonic discourse centred on devel-
opmentalist logorrhea regarding ‘the emergence of Côte d’Ivoire in a global world’. 
This discourse is establishing itself as the new regime of truth. The nationalist and 
anti-French hermeneutic of the Young Patriots is now confined to IPF activist circles 
and exiled Gbagbo supporters who seek to promote a different reading of the events 
of 2010‒11: that of a colonial conspiracy hatched on the banks of the Seine. Will 
the profits to be had from economic and political reconstruction inevitably spell the 
gradual disappearance of this recurrent motif? Has the relative success of Operation 
Serval in Mali definitively turned the page on Franco-African ‘incomprehension’? 
Nothing could be less certain. As we have seen above, the strength of the anti-co-
lonialist theme stems from long-standing and very profound alienation within West 
African societies in general and Côte d’Ivoire in particular. It is part of a particular 
historicity in which extraversion holds a central place.52 This explains the fundamen-
tal ambivalence of the relationship of attraction-repulsion that is to be observed in 
the fits and starts of France’s interventionist policy in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The wars waged in Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic 
as well as the earlier operations in the DRC, Chad and Darfur have undeniably led to 
the increasing militarisation of France’s relations with African societies. Today more 
than ever, these many-sided relations, seem to have been reduced to their military 
and warlike aspect. One must not be misled by the positive outcomes of the Mali 
51 To once again cite G. Salamé, Appels d’empire, op. cit.
52  See J.-F. Bayart, ‘L’Afrique dans le monde, une histoire d’extraversion’, Critique internationale, No. 5 (1999), 
pp. 97‒120.
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intervention. French policy on the continent is generally perceived – negatively – 
through a twofold prism: military intervention and the European repression of mi-
gration. Western military intervention and police cooperation increasingly appear as 
the military arm of a new civilising mission in many respects reminiscent of colonial 
‘pacification’ and the ‘whip’. In a context in which the themes of the colonial legacy, 
anti-imperialism and alienated sovereignty are returning to the forefront of social 
struggles and citizen movements, one may conjecture that this security-based optic 
will eventually stoke new resistance to ‘Western imperialism’. We have seen the ex-
tent to which this theme was at work in the Ivorian case. In a few years, it is not im-
possible that disappointed followers of Ouattara will regroup around the nationalist 
cause formerly championed by the patriotic fringe. This is of course still not the case 
in Mali, where French involvement has generally been met with approval. Yet in this 
fiercely nationalist country, where the national epic is based on the story of Sundiata 
and anti-globalisationist tendencies53 are not unknown, this perception might also 
be reversed and give way to an anti-French counter-mobilisation challenging the 
neo-colonial reconquest of an ever more coveted Sahara.54 Despite the precautions 
taken to avoid any confusion with a war against Islam, it is now not impossible that 
the conflict in Northern Mali (and the more complex war in the Central African Re-
public) might contribute to the development of a counter-discourse of resistance to 
the French presence joining radical Islam with the themes of anti-colonialism and 
anti-imperialism.
53  See J. Siméant, Contester au Mali. Formes de la mobilisation et de la critique à Bamako (Paris: Karthala, 
2014).
54  In May 2014, the MNLA reconquered Kidal despite the presence of a large force of French and UN troops. This 
gave rise to strong emotions in Bamako, where France was loudly booed.
